When do legislators pass on "pork"?
When do legislators pass on "pork"?
Rate this book:
About This Book
"The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, they find that legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies where voters are more attached to political parties. They are also lower in constituencies that are reserved for members of socially disadvantaged groups (lower castes), specifically in those reserved constituencies that are candidate strongholds. This result is robust to controls for alternate explanations and implies that legislators pass on pork when voters are more attached to political parties or influenced by identity issues. These findings have implications for the evaluation of constituency development funds. They also provide a new answer to a central issue in political economy, the conditions under which legislators seek to "bring home the pork" to constituents, that attaches great importance to the role of political parties. "--World Bank web site.
Buy This Book
As an Amazon Associate and Bookshop.org affiliate, BookOrb earns from qualifying purchases.
Write a Review
Sign in to write a review.
More by Philip Keefer
A review of the political econ
A review of the political economy of governance
Better Governments for Better
Better Governments for Better Lives
Boondoggles and expropriation
Boondoggles and expropriation
Checks and balances, private i
Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
Democracy, credibility, and cl
Democracy, credibility, and clientelism
Democracy, public expenditures
Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor