A costly signaling theory of hard look review
A costly signaling theory of hard look review
12 min read
Rate this book:
About This Book
A judge who must review a government agency decision may require the agency to submit a sufficient explanation or justification, usually written, of its actions; this is called a "hard look review." The author suggests that even if the judge is not an expert in a particular field, the quality of the agency's explanation may signal to the judge the agency's commitment to a certain policy.
Buy This Book
As an Amazon Associate and Bookshop.org affiliate, BookOrb earns from qualifying purchases.
Write a Review
Sign in to write a review.
More by Matthew C. Stephenson
A Costly signaling theory of h
A Costly signaling theory of hard look revie
Bureaucratic decision costs an
Bureaucratic decision costs and endogenous agency
Court of public opinion
Court of public opinion
Formal models of Judicial powe
Formal models of Judicial power
Legislative allocation of dele
Legislative allocation of delegated power
Political accountability under
Political accountability under alternative institutional regimes