Threat-ambiguous defense planning
Threat-ambiguous defense planning
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About This Book
The author contends that defense planning will become increasingly difficult in the post-cold war world because the 'threat' is no longer apparent and identifiable. Containing ethnic conflicts and participating in peacekeeping/ peace-enforcing/humanitarian missions do not lend themselves to a force development process that is predominantly threat-dependent. Since the late 1960s the Australian Department of Defense has been forced to create a capabilities- based planning system. This report assesses the background to the development of the system, its basic methodology, its problems, and, probably most importantly, the lessons learned by Australia during its creation. Our Australian allies believe that, in order to create a truly joint force, force development responsibilities must be shifted from the individual services to the joint arena. Reviewing the Australian experience may provide needed insights and novel ideas for the many governments currently wrestling with questions of size, shape, and function of their military establishments in a post-cold war world.
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