Elections and accountability in South Africa

This paper explores these different aspects of voter behaviour to assess whether elections can act as an effective accountability mechanism in South Africa. It finds that, while voters are willing to withdraw support from the incumbent party if they disapprove of its performance, they are unlikely to move their support to another party. Sanctioning government performance in the traditional sense is weak, making political accountability through elections more elusive. Paradoxically, the way in which political accountability currently manifests itself in the South African political system may actually lead to the entrenchment of one-party dominance, further reducing incentives for responsive and accountable governance by the incumbent party. The paper concludes that in the South African context electoral accountability relies less on the notion of sanctions as a means to punish government. Instead, greater attention should be given to the method of 'selection' as a means to control politicians. If this line of reasoning is adopted, elections can still act as an accountability mechanism and even as a sanctioning device. An accountability relationship can therefore be established when voters regard elections as an opportunity to choose among parties to select the best possible party on offer.