Conscription as regulation
Conscription as regulation
Rate this book:
About This Book
"We examine the practice of military conscription around the world from the perspective of two standard theories, and a new one, which emphasizes the fixed cost of introducing and administering the draft as a deterrent to its use. We find that, holding the relative size of the military constant, higher population countries are more likely to use the draft. We also find that French legal origin countries, which we see as facing lower fixed and variable administrative costs, are more likely to draft than are common law countries. Conscription does not seem to be influenced by democracy, and is influenced by the deadweight costs of taxation only in countries with very large militaries. The results suggest that fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations may be an important determinant of their use"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Buy This Book
As an Amazon Associate and Bookshop.org affiliate, BookOrb earns from qualifying purchases.
Write a Review
Sign in to write a review.
More by Casey B. Mulligan
A century of labor-leisure dis
A century of labor-leisure distortions
A dual method of empirically e
A dual method of empirically evaluating dynamic competitive equilibrium models with market distortions, applied to the Great Depression and World War II
A labor-income-based measure o
A labor-income-based measure of the value of human capital
A labour-income-based measure
A labour-income-based measure of the value of human capital
Adoption of financial technolo
Adoption of financial technologies
Aggregate implications of indi
Aggregate implications of indivisible labor