Biography
Professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Books by Drew Fudenberg
A long-run collaboration on long-run games
Learning to play Bayesian game
Learning to play Bayesian games
Pricing under the threat of en
Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good
The neo-Luddite's lament
The neo-Luddite's lament
The theory of learning in games
Payoff information and self-co
Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Learning mixed equilibria
Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games
Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
Self-confirming equilibrium
Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information
Monopoly and credibility in asset markets
The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information
Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria
Repeated games with long-run and short-run players
Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales
Finite player approximations to a continuum of players
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player
Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
Predation without reputation
Sequential bargaining with many buyers
The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information